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Centros, California’s “Women on Boards” Statute and the Scope of
Regulatory Competition
Jill Fisch
Steven Davidoff Solomon*
May 7, 2019 draft
European Business Organization Law Review (forthcoming)
Abstract
We examine the Centros decision through the lens of SB 826 – the California statute mandating a
minimum number of women on boards. SB 826, like the Centros decision, raises questions about
the scope of the internal affairs doctrine and its role in encouraging regulatory competition.
Despite the claim that US corporate law is characterized by regulatory competition, in the US, the
internal affairs doctrine has led to less variation in corporate law than in Europe. We theorize
that this is due to the shareholder primacy norm in US corporate law which results in the internal
affairs doctrine focusing on matters of shareholder interest and, primarily, shareholder economic
interest. We argue that the internal affairs doctrine should be understood within the context of the
shareholder primacy norm and therefore directed to rules oriented to enhancing firm economic
value. In contrast, EU corporate law has traditionally had broader stakeholder orientation. We
posit that the limited impact of the Centros decision, an impact which differed significantly from
its predicted revolutionary effect, can be attributed to the greater focus of EU corporate law on
social ordering and extra-shareholder interests. This difference leads to a new understanding of
SB 826 as reflecting a move toward more EU-style governance focused on social ordering.
Ironically, California’s adoption of SB 826 may portend a movement of the United States towards
Centros-style governance. Under this analysis, we argue that SB 826 should not be viewed as
inconsistent with the internal affairs doctrine since it involves social ordering rather than purely
shareholder interests.
Introduction
It has been twenty years since the European Court of Justice issued its decision in
Centros.1 Since that time, Centros has been widely understood as shifting the European Union
(EU) from the real seat doctrine, in which a corporation is governed by the corporate law of the
country in which it is headquartered, to an era of increased corporate mobility.2 Specifically
*
Jill Fisch is the Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law
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1
Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459.
2
See, e.g., Carney 2001, p. 718 n.5 (”For European Community members, the real seat rule appears to have been
repealed in favor of the internal affairs rule by the recent decision of the Court of Justice of the European
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Centros, together with subsequent decisions, allowed EU corporations, by incorporating in
another jurisdiction, to choose their governing corporate law deliberately.3
We consider the Centros decision in the context of the current debate, in the United
States, over the legitimacy of SB 826, the California statute mandating that public companies
whose principal executive offices are located in California have a minimum number of female
directors.4 California has previously attempted to resist the limitations of the internal affairs
doctrine by imposing its corporate law on so-called foreign corporations, corporations that are
incorporated outside the state but conduct the majority of their business in California. The
legitimacy of these attempts has been hotly contested and, indeed rejected by the Delaware
courts.5 SB 826 is different from other aspects of California’s foreign corporation law, however,
in that it applies exclusively to public companies and to all such companies that have their
principal executive offices located within the state. The extent to which California has the power
to extend the reach of its corporate law this far is disputed, and at least one prominent
commentator has already argued that SB 826 is invalid to the extent it applies to corporations
that are not both chartered and headquartered in California.6
SB 826 is somewhat distinctive from most US corporate law, however, in that it
addresses a timely and controversial public policy issue – gender quotas for corporate boards.
From the US perspective, corporate law is focused primarily on limiting managerial agency costs
and maximizing shareholder value. The connection between gender quotas and shareholder
value remains unclear. As such, SB 826 highlights the question of the degree to which the
internal affairs doctrine is intertwined with the objective of shareholder value maximization and
with, more generally, the principle of shareholder primacy. Shareholder primacy has emerged as
a dominant organizing principle of U.S. corporate law. 7 This enables the internal affairs doctrine
to serve as a tool for economic ordering.
Shareholder primacy reflects, to a large extent, a peculiarly US perspective.8 Most of the
EU does not subscribe to shareholder primacy. The interests of other stakeholders – creditors,
employees and communities – play a more compelling role in EU company law. One example is
the protection of employee interests, in several EU countries, through codetermination. Another
is the proliferation of jurisdictions that have adopted legislation imposing gender quotas on

Communities, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervsog Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 708 (Mar. 9 1999)”); Doré
2014, p. 331 (observing that, although commentators initially debated the scope of the Centros decision, “there is
now general agreement that the EU Treaty requires Member States to apply the internal affairs rule to companies
organized in other European countries.”).
3
Doré 2014, p. 221.
4
Senate Bill 826.
5
See, e.g., VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1110 n.1 (Del. 2005).
6
See Grundfest 2018, p. 1 (arguing that, except with respect to 72 such corporations, SB 826 is unconstitutional
“because of the internal affairs doctrine”).
77
See American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance §2.01 (1994).
8
The UK also adheres the principal of shareholder primacy. For a call to reconsider shareholder primacy and a
claim that a corporation’s purpose should extend beyond profit maximization see The British Academy 2018.
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corporate boards.9 We argue that the commitment by EU member states to these interests raises
serious questions about the viable scope of US-style regulatory competition in Europe.
SB 826 highlights the difference in orientation. SB 826, which reflects a concern with
broader societal goals such as discrimination and sexual harassment, can be understood as an
effort to extend corporate law to issues beyond shareholder value maximization and to consider
the type of stakeholder interests that play a greater role in the EU. As such, the application of the
internal affairs doctrine to SB 826 is, we argue, uncharted territory. California was the first US
state to adopt a mandatory gender quota, although several other states subsequently indicated a
willingness to follow California’s lead.10 This development raises critical questions about the
extent to which the US internal affairs doctrine constrains state regulatory power.
In the case of SB 826, we argue that the shareholder primacy norm informs the validity of
California’s actions. We argue that because US corporate law focuses on principles of
shareholder primacy, these principles offer a basis for limiting the scope of regulatory
competition.11 Specifically, we claim that the internal affairs doctrine can be understood as
limited to matters that are subject to internal ordering and relationships among the firm’s
officers, directors and shareholders. Under this rubric, pure matters of corporate governance are
subject to the internal affairs doctrine while laws governing external interests are not. We argue
that SB 826 falls within the latter category. 12
These principles explain the effect of Centros and perhaps its future course. Centros
generated widespread concern that it would introduce US-style regulatory competition into the
EU. Although a significant number of corporations responded to the enhanced mobility provided
by Centros, the decision primarily had the effect of narrowing the differences in capitalization
requirements across Europe. Corporations largely failed to use the freedom of incorporation to
avoid other elements of their home county’s corporate law. We argue that this result can be
explained by the fact that regulatory competition, and the internal affairs doctrine which makes
such competition possible, are focused on principles of economic ordering relating to
shareholder value. The broader range of objectives addressed by EU company law results in a
deeper commitment to country-specific differences both at the political level and in the context
of specific firm decisions, a commitment that is not readily undercut by freedom of
establishment. In this regard, the EU is unlikely to see substantial additional convergence in
corporate law. Indeed, as SB 826 portends, this reality may be coming to the United States and
its own peculiar form of regulatory competition. In other words, and ironically, while the past
history of the internal affairs doctrine in the US partially explains Centros’ effects, the
9

See von Meyerinck, et al. 2019 (observing that Norway, “Belgium, France, Germany, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy,
and Spain have all established” mandatory gender quotas for corporate boards).
10
On March 29, 2018, the Illinois House advanced a bill that would mandate both gender and racial diversity on
corporate boards. See Bainbridge 2019. A pending bill in the New Jersey legislature would require public
companies to have a minimum of three female directors on their boards. Vittorio 2018.
11
See Fisch 2006.
12
The statute may also be vulnerable under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Civil Rights
Act. See, e.g., Amar and Mazzone 2018 (discussing analysis under the Equal Protection Clause). This article does
not address those issues.
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limitations of the Centros decision in the EU may explain the future of the internal affairs
doctrine in the United States.
1. Centros and its progeny
1.1 The Centros Trilogy
Until 1999, many countries in Europe adhered to the real seat doctrine, in which a
corporation is governed by the law of the country in which its head office is located.13 In a trio of
decisions starting with the 1999 Centros decision, the European Court of Justice held that the
real seat doctrine cannot be used to deny recognition or apply domestic corporate law to a
corporation that is validly formed in another EU member state. 14 This had the effect of
recognizing the principle of free choice of incorporation.15
Centros involved Danish citizens who formed a U.K. corporation to avoid Denmark’s
minimum capital requirements. When they sought to register a branch office of the corporation
to do business in Denmark, Denmark refused to register it. The Court held that “the fact that a
national of a Member State who wishes to set up a company chooses to form it in the Member
State whose rules of company law seem to him the least restrictive and to set up branches in
other Member States cannot, in itself, constitute an abuse of the right of establishment.”16
Consequently, the Court concluded that Denmark was required to register Centros to do
business.
Commentators initially questioned the scope of the Centros decision.17 As a result, the
“death knell” of the real seat doctrine did not come until 2002, when the ECJ decided
Überseering.18 Germans bought the stock of Überseering, a Dutch company, and moved its
operations to Germany. Subsequently, Überseering filed suit in Germany against Nordic, a
German company. The German court held that Überseering did not have the legal capacity to
bring suit because Germany, a real seat country, required Überseering to reincorporate in
Germany when it moved its operations there, and Überseering had not done so. The ECJ
disagreed, holding that articles 43 and 48 of the EU Treaty required both that Germany recognize
Überseering as a valid Dutch corporation and uphold its right to bring suit in Germany.
The final decision of the trio repudiating the real seat doctrine was Inspire Art.19 Inspire
Art was what amounts to a pseudo-foreign corporation, essentially a Dutch company that had
13

Other countries adhered to the incorporation doctrine, which applied the law of the country in which the business
was incorporated. Gelter 2017.
14
Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH, 2002 E.C.R.
I-9919. See Gelter 2017.
15
Gelter 2017.
16
Centros, ¶ 27.
17
See, e.g., Gelter 2017.
18
Id.
19
Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I10155.
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been organized under U.K. law, ostensibly to avoid capital requirements imposed by Dutch
corporate law. Although the Netherlands did not adhere to the real seat doctrine and recognized
foreign corporations, its company law took a similar approach to §2115 of the California statute
and applied various components of its corporate law to pseudo-foreign corporations such as
Inspire Art.20
The Netherlands defended its statute by arguing that it was nondiscriminatory and that it
provided only minimal obligations necessary to protect those in the Netherlands who deal with
corporations, whether foreign or domestic. The ECJ was not persuaded. It held first “that the
fact that the company was formed in a particular Member State for the sole purpose of enjoying
the benefit of more favourable legislation does not constitute abuse even if that company
conducts its activities entirely or mainly in that second State.”21 Second, the ECJ concluded
“that Articles 43 EC and 48 EC preclude national legislation such as the WFBV which imposes
on the exercise of freedom of secondary establishment in that State by a company formed in
accordance with the law of another Member State certain conditions provided for in domestic
law in respect of company formation relating to minimum capital and directors' liability.”22
1.2 The Impact of the Centros Trilogy
The result of the three decisions – Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art -- was to provide
greater scope for corporations in the EU to select their state of incorporation and, through that
selection, the applicable company law regime. As one commentator explains, “It is no abuse of
the freedom of establishment if the company founders select the law which best suits their needs
even if, as a result, the company is established under a more permissible company law regime
than the one prevailing at its real seat.” 23
Following the decisions, a number of commentators predicted that the decisions would
lead to regulatory competition among EU nations akin to that in the United States.24 They
further expressed the concern that this competition would lead to a race-to-the bottom as opposed

20

The applicable Dutch law was the Wetop de Formeel Buitenlandse Vennootschappen (Law on Formally Foreign
Companies) (WFBV). The “WFBV defines a formally foreign company as a capital company formed under laws
other than those of the Netherlands and having legal personality, which carries on its activities entirely or almost
entirely in the Netherlands and also does not have any real connection with the State within which the law under
which the company was formed applies.” Inspire Art ¶22. The WFBV imposed various obligations on formally
foreign companies including “obligations concerning the company's registration in the commercial register, an
indication of that status in all the documents produced by it, the minimum share capital and the drawing-up,
production and publication of the annual documents.” Id. ¶23.
21
Id. at ¶96.
22
Id. at ¶105.
23
Kieninger 2009, p. 609.
24
See, e.g., Dammann 2004 p. 530 (“European corporations faced with the prospect of free choice are likely to
reincorporate in one or a few Member States, and it is highly probable that one or more of the smaller Member
States will emerge as the leading jurisdiction(s).”).
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to no race or a race to the top.25 Other commentators argued that concerns about a race to the
bottom were overstated, and that regulatory competition would likely be limited by a number of
a factors such as the absence of any Member state with the characteristics to make it likely to
emerge as a winner in the competition for corporate charters as well as the relatively greater
importance of non-shareholder interests such as those of employees and banks.26 As Ron Gilson
has observed: “the effect of Centros may be attenuated by responsive efforts by EC member
states to impose restrictions in ways that cannot be avoided by instrumental choice of where to
incorporate.”27
Over the twenty years since the Centros decision the greatest fears of commentators
concerning Centros’ effect of creating a European “Delaware” failed to appear.28 Instead,
Centros has mostly have leveling effects in corporate law. In the immediate wake of Centros,
Marco Becht, Colin Mayer, and Hannes Wagner found a substantial increase in the number of
private limited companies from other EU Member States incorporating in England and Wales
from 1997 to 2005, an increase that the authors attribute to the ECJ rulings.29 Most of the
corporations that elected to incorporate outside of their real seat did so in an effort to avoid
minimum capital requirements.30
In order to stem this flight risk, the major EU countries reformed their corporate law to
reduce minimum capitalization requirements and to more generally conform basic corporate
governance features with English law. 31 This corporate law reform was paired with a shift of
creditor protection from corporate law to insolvency law, which allowed the forum state to
reassert its interest in protecting local creditors.32 Luca Enriques and Martin Gelter term this
“insolvencification.”33 The end result of these reforms was to stem reincorporation from the
continent to the United Kingdom. A subsequent study reports a significant decrease in migration
of German firms to incorporate in the UK after 2006 and concludes that the migration observed
by Becht et al. may merely have been a “flash in the pan.”34

25

See, e.g., Jankolovits 2004, p. 1004 (“[T]he holding in Centros may create a race for the bottom in Europe.”). See
generally Fisch 2000 (describing academic debate over whether regulatory competition results in a race to the
bottom, a race to the top, or no race at all).
26
See, e.g., Tröger 2005.
27
Gilson, 2001.
28
See, e.g., Gelter and Reif 2017, p. 1426 (observing that “the jurisdiction within the United Kingdom called
‘England and Wales’ did not establish itself as the European Delaware”).
29
Becht et al. 2008, p. 242.
30
Incorporation choices were also the result of company-specific incorporation costs. See Becht et al. 2008.
31
See Ferran 2019 (observing that “the Centros decision . . . was a powerful catalyst for the dynamic dismantling of
minimum capital requirements in national company laws”).
32
Choice of law rules in insolvency law “more closely resemble the real seat doctrine.” Bruner 2018. See Kornhaas
v. Dithmar, CJEU Case No. C-5941/14 [2016] (holding that the application of German national law regarding the
reimbursement of dividend payments made by a director after insolvency is properly characterized as insolvency law
rather than company law and, as a result, does not infringe freedom of establishment as applied to an English
corporation operating in Germany).
33
Enriques and Gelter 2007, pp. 600-602.
34
Ringe 2013, p. 262.
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The limited effect of Centros is even more startling in that other, more defining (and
arguably more burdensome) features of country-specific corporate law have failed to spur more
corporate flight.35 Martin Gelter, for example, argued that corporations could use Centros to
avoid Germany’s codetermination requirement.36 This fear initially appeared justified when, in
2006, Air Berlin went public as a UK company in a move that was widely explained as an effort
to avoid codetermination.37 Some commentators predicted that other corporations would follow
Air Berlin’s lead, but this prediction failed to materialize. Rather, Air Berlin was exceptional,
and only a handful of other German companies incorporated outside of Germany to avoid
codetermination.38 At the time, commentators also debated the legal question of whether issuers
could even use regulatory competition to avoid codetermination.39 In the 25 years since the
Centros decision, the ECJ has never addressed this question.40
Why did Centros not result in greater regulatory competition in Europe? 41 We argue that
this question can be addressed, in part, by a better understanding of the true scope of regulatory
competition in the United States, as effectuated through the internal affairs doctrine.
2. Regulatory Competition in the United States
2.1 The Origins of the U.S. Internal Affairs Doctrine
The real seat doctrine has never been a feature of US law and thus there is no Centroslike decision governing corporate mobility in the United States. Rather, corporations in the US
historically have been free to incorporate in the state of their choice and to have that state’s
corporate law govern their affairs rather than the law of the state in which they conduct their
operations. The principle that allows this is known as the internal affairs doctrine which
effectively allows corporations to choose their corporate law by determining in which state to
incorporate.42

35

Dammann 2003, p. 613 (describing whether Germany would be able to keep codetermiation as “the single most
relevant question in the wake of Centros”).
36
Gelter 2018 (reasoning that “’regulatory competition’ on the US model could permit a German firm to shuck codetermination and its two-tiered board via a simple merger with a UK shell set up for purpose of the merger”).
37
See Wiesmann 2006.
38
See Roth 2010 (stating that the Centros trio “has not produced any visible effect on German co-determination
practice” and observing that, as of 2010, only 37 German companies incorporated or reincorporated outside of
Germany to avoid codetermination and “The only major company incorporated as a public limited company (plc) is
Germany′s second biggest airline, Air Berlin.”).
39
See, e.g., Troger 2005 (“The explicitly ′political′ character of codetermination as a specific distributional
settlement between corporate constituents makes it questionable whether a simple opt-out can be legitimised.
Although freedom of choice in corporate law is generally granted, an opt-out from codetermination might be
barred”).
40
See Hodge 2010, p. 142 (observing that “the ECJ has never specifically addressed a case where freedom of
establishment has been used to avoid codetermination”).
41
Moreover, any such result is far less likely after Brexit. See, e.g., Eidenmuller 2018 (arguing that Brexit will
lessen regulatory competition by making it more difficult to choose UK law in the future).
42
Ventoruzzo 2007.
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Although the internal affairs doctrine is widely-cited as a major tenet of U.S. corporate
law, it did not arise out of a deliberate policy decision to promote regulatory competition.
Rather, it began as a tool that enabled each state’s legislature to exercise control over the
regulation of local corporations.44 Courts perpetuated the internal affairs doctrine in the face of
developing charter competition, largely as a response to interest group pressure and competition
among states to retain local business operations, competition that would have been threatened by
restrictive corporate law rules.45 The resulting so-called market for corporate law has led to what
some commentators describe as regulatory competition.46 It has also spurred a debate about
whether the U.S. is racing to the top or bottom in corporate law in terms of corporate law
quality.47
Both the scope of the internal affairs doctrine and its legal basis remain somewhat
unclear. Some commentators have taken the position that the doctrine is constitutionally
compelled, finding constitutional foundations for the internal affairs doctrine in the Commerce
Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause.48 Notably, the Delaware courts have asserted this
claim powerfully. For example, the Delaware Supreme Court in VantagePoint 49 stated that “The
‘internal affairs doctrine is a major tenet of Delaware corporation law having important federal
constitutional underpinnings.’”50 Other commentators, however, challenge the constitutional
claim and argue that the internal affairs doctrine is simply a choice of law doctrine.51
Even within the United States, the principle that a corporation’s internal affairs will be
regulated by the law of the state of incorporation is not absolute. A few states, most notably
New York and California, have adopted legislation that explicitly attempts to limit the scope of
the internal affairs doctrine as applied to local corporations that are incorporated in other states.52
These statutes are commonly described as “foreign” or “pseudo-foreign” corporation statutes.
43

43

VantagePoint. at 1116 (quoting McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 209 (Del. 1987)).
Tung 2006, pp. 45-46.
45
Id. As Richard Buxbaum lucidly explains, the internal affairs doctrine began as a concept that addressed the
power of courts to exercise jurisdiction over foreign corporations. Buxbaum 1987. See H.N.P., Jr. 1949, p. 666
(“Since the middle of the last century, American courts have uniformly expressed their reluctance to entertain
controversies arising from the ‘internal affairs’ of corporations incorporated in other states.”). Even at this time, the
scope of the doctrine was unclear. As one court noted, to undertake an enumeration of when jurisdiction would and
would not be entertained “would be a difficult and hazardous venture.” Travis v. Knox Terpezone Co., 215 N.Y.
259, 264, 109 N.E. 250, 251 (1915).
46
See, e.g. Ribstein and O’Hara 2008 (describing debate over regulatory competition).
47
See, e.g., Cary 1974 (claiming that issuer freedom to choose corporate law through selection of a state of
incorporation produces a “race to the bottom”); Winter 1977 (challenging Cary’s claim and arguing that regulatory
competition results in a “race to the top”).
48
See, e.g., Suggs 1995, p. 1103 (“the requirements of a federal system of coequal sovereign states necessitates the
promotion of [the internal affairs] doctrine to constitutional status”).
49
VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108 (Del. 2005).
50
Id. See also McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 216-17 (concluding that the internal affairs doctrine is
“compelled’ by the Due Process Clause, the Commerce Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
51
See Rubenfeld 1988 (analyzing and rejecting arguments that the internal affairs doctrine is compelled by the
Commerce Clause); Stevelman 2009 (“Under modern law the [internal affairs doctrine] is best understood merely as
a choice of law regime”); O’Hara and Ribstein 2009 (asserting that the doctrine does not have “special constitutional
status”).
52
See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§1317-1320; Cal. Corp. Code § 2115.
44
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Both the California and New York provisions have traditionally applied only to corporations that
conduct a designated amount of business within the state. They also exclude listed or publiclytraded companies from their scope.53
The justification for these statutory incursions upon the internal affairs doctrine is that
they are consistent with conflict of law principles that authorize states to regulate firms that have
substantial ties with the state. For example, under standard “interest analysis” a forum state may
apply its local law when it has a strong policy interest in doing so, despite the claim that another
state’s law should apply. Thus, in Havlicek,54 a California court used a conflict of laws analysis
to determine the scope of the inspection rights of the director of a corporation incorporated in
Delaware. The court reasoned that “California’s interest would be more impaired by the
application of Delaware law than Delaware’s interest would be impaired by the opposite result.
California law applies to the inspection issue.”55
The Delaware courts have challenged this analysis, reasoning that the internal affairs
doctrine is of Constitutional magnitude and, as a result, other states do not have the power to
apply these statutes to Delaware-incorporated firms56 This dispute between California and
Delaware remains unresolved, and may presumably be exacerbated by SB 826, which is not
limited to corporations that conduct the majority of their operations in California.57
2.2 The Scope of the U.S. Internal Affairs Doctrine
In terms of scope, the internal affairs doctrine in the US has the role of policing the
boundary between corporate law, which is dictated by the state of incorporation and other laws
such as environmental law, labor law, consumer protection law, etc. which are determined by the
forum state. In addressing this objective, the key question is whether the statute or legal rule is
directed to internal corporate constituencies or affects the interests of third parties external to the
corporation. As Vice-Chancellor Laster observed in Sciabacucci v. Salzberg, “the state of
incorporation cannot use corporate law to regulate the corporation’s external relationships.”58
How does one distinguish between internal and external relationships? A starting point is
differentiating between internal corporate constituencies and third parties external to the
corporation.59 Former Delaware Supreme Court Justice Jack Jacobs explains that those internal
53

The extent to which foreign corporation statutes are invalid under the internal affairs doctrine is unclear and is, in
fact, the subject of an ongoing disagreement between the Delaware and California courts. Edwards 2010.
54
Havlicek v. Coast-to-Coast Analytical Services, Inc., 39 Cal. App. 4th 1844 (Cal. App. 1995).
55
Id. at 1853.
56
Thus, for example in VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108 (Del. 2005). the
Delaware Supreme Court held that the U.S. Constitution prohibited California from imposing its corporate
governance rules on companies with substantial business ties to California that were incorporated elsewhere.
57
See, e.g., Stevens 2007 (comparing the perspectives of the courts in both states). Absent a determination by the
U.S. Supreme Court that the internal affairs doctrine is constitutionally compelled, it is unclear how this difference
could be resolved.
58
Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 578 (2018).
59
See Rubenfeld 1988, p. 379-80 (“There can be no bright line-indeed no line at all-drawn to separate internal and
external affairs; a corporation's internal affairs are external affairs when they implicate third-party rights”).
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corporate constituencies are typically a corporation’s officers, directors and shareholders.60
Consistent with the principle of shareholder primacy,61 US law provides shareholders with
distinctive treatment relative to other corporate stakeholders.62 As the court explained in
Salzberg, whether a forum selection bylaw dealt with an internal corporate affair was determined
by analyzing whether the bylaw addressed the rights and powers of a stockholder “as a
stockholder.”63 Similarly the Restatement (2d) of Conflicts of Laws defines internal affairs as
“[m]atters . . . which involve primarily a corporation’s relationship to its shareholders.”64
The fact that the statute addresses internal corporate constituencies is not enough; the
statute must also focus on internal issues rather than external activities.65 In. Salzberg, Laster
explained that Delaware corporate law, by virtue of the internal affairs doctrine, could regulate
matters such as “the rights, powers, and privileges of a share of stock, determine who holds a
corporate office, and adjudicate the fiduciary relationships that exist within the corporate
form.”66 Jack Jacobs observed that “Illustrative examples of internal affairs include: the
mechanics of incorporating, the election or appointment of officers and directors, the adoption of
by-laws, the issuance of shares and bonds, the holding of directors' and shareholders' meetings,
voting, the right to examine corporate records, corporate charter and by-law amendments,
mergers, reorganizations, the reclassification of shares, the declaration and payment of
dividends, and stock repurchases and redemptions.”67
2.3. The Proper Scope of the Internal Affairs Doctrine
We argue that, although neither courts nor commentators have developed a satisfactory
definition of the internal affairs doctrine, the explanations and examples cited here reflect a
common core principle: the internal affairs doctrine applies to rules governing the economic
relationships among shareholders, officers and directors. As such, the internal affairs doctrine is
critically intertwined with the norm of shareholder primacy. Similarly, we argue that rules
addressed to issues of general social welfare and the rights of third-party stakeholders fall outside
the parameters of the internal affairs doctrine. 68

60

Jacobs 2009, p. 1161 (“The internal affairs doctrine is a judge-made choice-of-law rule which mandates that
disputes regarding ‘internal affairs’—'those matters which are peculiar to the relationships among or between the
corporation and its … directors, officers and shareholders’ - are governed by the laws of the state of
incorporation.”).
61
See generally Smith 1998 (describing the shareholder primacy norm in U.S. corporate law).
62
For example, directors and officers are accountable to shareholders alone by the constraints of fiduciary duties.
Similarly, shareholders have the authority to elect directors and exercise voting power with respect to designated
corporate transactions such as mergers and dissolutions.
63
2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 578 (2018).
64
Rest.2d Conf. of Laws, § 302, com. a, p. 307.
65
Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 578 (2018).
66
Id.
67
Jacobs 2009, p. 1161.
68
As the Supreme Court has noted, “As a general matter, the law of the state of incorporation normally determines
issues relating to the internal affairs of a corporation. … Different conflicts principles apply, however, where the
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We note that the considerations of predictability and fairness that are frequently cited in
support of the internal affairs doctrine focus on the role of corporate law in protecting
shareholder interests, and primarily shareholder economic interests, through regulation of issues
such as shareholder voting, director duties and the process for effecting a merger. For example,
the fact that a corporation may have shareholders throughout the world, allowing each
shareholder’s home country to seek to protect that shareholders interests through the application
of local law would be highly problematic. As the court observed in Citigroup Inc. v. AHW Inv.
P’ship:69 “When a public corporation such as Citigroup has shares in the market, it will have
investors from all around the world, and certainly in virtually every state in our nation. For
investors to be able to sue not only under federal law, but purport to sue under their own state's
bespoke laws, subjects corporations to potential inconsistencies, inefficiencies, and unfairness.”70
Understanding the internal affairs doctrine in terms of economic relationships provides
critical support for the doctrine and for the regulatory competition that it facilitates. In
particular, in a system with efficient capital markets, share prices will respond both to the
adoption of new legal rules and to firm-specific governance choices, but only as long as those
rules concern investor-oriented firm value. Regulatory competition enables corporations to
select those states that provide efficient rules because those rules will enhance share prices.71
The role of the capital markets is essential in preventing regulatory competition, through the
internal affairs doctrine, from generating a race to the bottom.72
Notably, however, the capital markets are ineffective in responding to legal rules that do
not affect share price such as rules that affect the interests of third-party stakeholders or general
social welfare.73 In addition, the U.S. system does not provide states with complete freedom to
compete. In areas in which regulatory competition is viewed as problematic, Congress, the SEC
and the stock exchanges have the ability to intervene and to eliminate such competition by
imposing a uniform rule.74 Similarly, regulations that focus on the protection of non-shareholder
interests are found outside the scope of corporate law where they are similarly insulated from
state competition.
2.4 The Import of the U.S. Internal Affairs Doctrine for Centros and the EU

rights of third parties external to the corporation are at issue.” First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio
Exterior De Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 621 (1983).
69
140 A.3d 1125, 1136.
70
Id. at 1136. The court nonetheless concluded that these concerns did not warrant extending the internal affairs
doctrine to the plaintiffs’ Holders Claims (claims alleging damages based on the plaintiffs’ continuing to hold stock
in reliance on the defendant’s misstatements).
71
See, e.g. Easterbrook and Fischel 1991.
72
See Winter 1977, pp. 251-52.
73
More problematically, the capital markets will not value the benefits legal rules provide to non-shareholder
stakeholders.
74
For example, the New York Stock Exchange requires listed corporations to have a minimum number of
independent directors on their boards. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.
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We argue that the above historical account shows that the internal affairs doctrine as
applied in the United States is one of economic ordering. More specifically, the effect of the
U.S. internal affairs doctrine has had a leveling effect akin to Centros’ effect (but in greater
measure). Corporate law rules in the U.S. do vary from state to state but in large measure are
identical in both scope and principle. The lack of significant litigation over the internal affairs
doctrine is testament to this harmony.
This account and understanding of the internal affairs doctrine has import for the future
of more substantive principles which involve issues which affect constituencies other than
stockholders. In order to address this issue and its impact on Centros better, we consider in the
next section the question of whether SB 826 is directed to internal corporate affairs. In the
following section we consider the application of these principles to regulatory competition in
Europe.
3. The California “Women on Boards” Statute
3.1 The Scope and Structure of SB 826
SB 826, California’s “Women on Boards” statute illustrates the uncertain scope of the
internal affairs doctrine. On Sept. 30, 2018, California Governor Jerry Brown signed SB 826
into law, making California the first U.S. state to require women on corporate boards of
directors. The statute applies to “publicly held domestic or foreign corporation[s] whose
principal executive offices, according to the corporation’s SEC 10-K form, are located in
California.”75
SB 826 initially requires that corporations subject to its requirements have at least one
female director on their boards by the end of 2019. By the end of 2021, the requirement increases
to a minimum of two female directors for corporations with a total board size of four or five
directors and three female directors for corporations with a board consisting of six or more
directors. Notably, the law does not require that women replace men who are currently serving
as directors, but authorizes a corporation simply to add additional women directors to the board.
Although the statute does not follow the European approach of designating that women comprise
a designated percentage of female directors on boards,76 the structure of the statute appears to
respond to a literature observing that the benefits of gender diversity on corporate boards require
a critical mass and that it is particularly beneficial to have at least three women directors.77
SB 826 was not California’s first effort to increase board diversity. In 2013, the
California legislature enacted a non-binding resolution, Senate Concurrent Resolution 62, which
75

Notably, neither SB 826 nor the federal securities laws provides a definition of principal executive offices. See
Bainbridge 2019a.
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2017.
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See, e.g., Kramer, et al. 2006.
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called for all publicly-traded corporations in California to have a minimum of 1-3 women on
their boards of directors within a timeline of three years.78 The resolution made California the
first state in the U.S. to “take a stand on gender diversity in the boardroom” and was described as
a “’California leads the nation’ moment.”79 Several other states adopted similar resolutions, but,
because the resolutions were non-binding, they did not generate substantial changes in board
diversity. One commentator observed that, as of the end of the three-year timeframe of SCR 62,
“approximately 20% of the firms included in the Russell 3000 Index and headquartered in
California complied with the resolution’s targeted number of female directors.”80
SB 826 was enacted as part of the California foreign corporation statute.81 It differs from
the rest of the California foreign corporation statute, however, in two critical ways. First, as
noted above, its application is based exclusively on the location of the corporation’s principal
executive offices. In contrast, the other provisions of §2115 only apply if both the corporation
does more than half its business in the state and has more than half of its voting securities held
by California residents.82 Second, rather than providing an exemption for publicly-traded
corporations, SB 826 applies exclusively to such corporations.
The statute grants the California Secretary of State the authority to enforce the statute by
imposing fines of $100,000 for the first violation and $300,000 for subsequent violations.83 The
author of the legislation, California state senator Hannah-Beth Jackson, said that “she believes
having more women in power could help reduce sexual assault and harassment in the
workplace.”84 Governor Brown signed the Bill despite significant commentary that it could be
unconstitutional.85
3.2 SB 826 and the Internal Affairs Doctrine
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Although commentators quickly characterized SB 826’s application to corporations
incorporated outside of California as impermissible based on the internal affairs doctrine,86 we
question that conclusion here. Specifically, we ask whether SB 826 truly addresses corporate
internal affairs. 87 At first blush, it seems like the answer to that question is obviously yes in that
SB 826 is addressed to the composition of the board of directors, and the board of directors is
vested with the legal authority to act for the corporation.88 Upon further reflection, however, this
analysis appears overly simplistic. It is not clear that any regulation that touches upon the board
of directors is necessary a matter of corporate internal affairs. SB does not seem to deal directly
with the board’s role or responsibilities. It does not address the identity of directors, the size or
structure of the board, the manner by which directors are selected, or their power and duties.
Unlike Dodd-Frank, it does not impose skill or knowledge requirements.89 Nor does it interfere
with existing corporate operations or shareholder choice by disqualifying any existing members
of the board.90
Instead, to determine whether SB 826 regulates internal corporate affairs, it is necessary
to interrogate whether SB 826 is directed to the corporate law objective of shareholder value
maximization. Toward this end, identifying California’s objectives in adopting SB 826 presents
some challenges. In its preamble, SB826 initially cites research that female board representation
improves corporate performance. Section 1 of the statute explicitly references a number of
independent research studies that, according to the statute, find that “publicly held companies
perform better when women serve on their boards of directors.”91 The problem with this
justification is that it is not clear that the statute is really about improving corporate economic
value.
First, despite the claims in the statute, the results of empirical studies evaluating the
relationship between female board representation and corporate economic performance have
been “largely inconclusive.”92 Although some empirical studies have found a positive
relationship between board diversity and economic performance,93 others have found no
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relationship94 or even, in some cases, a negative correlation.95 Establishing a causal relationship
is even more difficult – studies generally compare existing corporations with different levels of
female board representation,96 but it may be the case that those companies with more female
directors are different from their peers.97 As a result, the case that there is a causal relationship
between board diversity and firm value simply has not been made, and it is difficult to defend the
California statute in terms of its anticipated impact on firm economic performance.
Concededly empirical studies support the claim that, whether or not corporations perform
better with more female board representation, corporations with women on boards are run
differently, although again, the studies fail to demonstrate a causal relationship. There is
evidence that female board representation is associated with greater corporate social
responsibility.98 Empirical results indicate that companies that have female directors take fewer
risks, engage in less securities fraud, contribute more to charity99 and provide greater recognition
of the interests of diverse corporate stakeholders.100 Even if these associations were causal, they
would support the potential for gender diversity to enhance general social welfare rather than
shareholder value. Indeed, some commentators have expressly acknowledged that there is “no
business case for—or against—appointing women to corporate boards” and that efforts to
increase women’s representation should be based on “fairness and equality.”101
Second, the text of SB 826 demonstrates that a substantial motivation of the legislation
was to address social welfare considerations. One of these considerations is increasing the
representation of women in positions of leadership. As section 1 observes, despite constituting
approximately half of the workforce, women are substantially underrepresented in positions of
leadership in corporate America. In 2018, women held only 17.7% of board seats on Russell
3000 companies in the US.102 As of November 2018, half of these companies had no women
directors or only a single woman director.103 According to ISS, only 10% of lead independent
directors are women, and women comprise only 4% of board chairs.104 In 2018, women were
CEOs of just 4.8% of Fortune 500 companies.105 According to some commentators, a key tool
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for increasing female representation in the C-suite is by increasing the number of women on
boards.106 Anna Berringer at Catalyst argues, for example, that “In order for boards to appoint
more female CEOs, there first have to be more female board members to vote for them.”107 This
observation is supported by research finding that gender diversity on boards plays an important
role in both the appointment and success of women as CEOs.108
Studies also report that female board representation is correlated with greater gender
diversity throughout a corporation.109 Other research indicates that the presence of women
directors is associated with better professional employment opportunities and gender equality
practices in their corporations.110 Supporters of the California legislation justify the legislation in
terms of creating greater opportunities for women in the workplace and leading to corporations
with stronger corporate governance and social responsibility.111 Increasing the number of female
corporate leaders can also be seen as a response to potential #MeToo problems, at least to the
extent that women can influence corporate culture and promote the values of diversity and
inclusion.112
We further note that the structure of SB 826 is poorly tailored to the objective of
maximizing firm economic value. For one thing, the statute’s jurisdictional scope is weakly tied,
at best, to the economic interests of the state of California. The jurisdictional reach of the statute
is not based on the number of a corporation’s California shareholders. Nor does SB 826 apply to
corporations that conduct a substantial percentage of their operations in the state, provide a
substantial number of jobs to California residents or furnish California with substantial tax or
other revenue. Instead, the jurisdictional hook of a corporation’s principal executive office is a
statement about corporate leadership and visibility. Regulation of the public companies that are
subject to SB 826 serves the California’s political objectives. Regulating the diversity of their
leadership is consistent with California’s reputation as a progressive leader, a role in which
California can be particularly effective given its size and the number of businesses that operate
within the state.113 California has frequently led the way in adopting progressive legislation, and
other states often follow its initiatives.114
As such, we argue that SB 826 is better understood as promoting the interests of women
executives, employees, and members of society and, as such, is directed to the promotion of
106
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societal value rather than shareholder wealth.115 This analysis challenges the traditional scope of
the internal affairs doctrine. Although we do not claim that protecting stakeholders is necessarily
inconsistent with or even orthogonal to shareholder value, this objective reflects a broader
conception of corporate purpose and corporate objectives.116 Importantly, we do not intend, in
making this claim, to take a position as to whether these objectives are normatively desirable or
whether it is appropriate to use corporate law to attempt to achieve the social objectives of
diversity through board quotas.
Although SB 826 offers an opportunity to consider the relationship of the shareholder
primacy norm to calls for a broader conception of corporate purpose and responsibilities, it is not
the only such example. Similar questions are implicated by the ongoing debate over corporate
sustainability and ESG.117 Commentators continue to question the extent to which sustainability
considerations affect economic performance.118 Indeed, the SEC has long opposed requiring
sustainability disclosure as part of issuer financial reporting on the basis that it addresses issues
that are not economically material to shareholders.119 Similarly the Department of Labor has
cautioned public pension funds that the consideration of societal and stakeholder interests in their
investment and governance decisions may conflict with their responsibilities to their
beneficiaries.120
Some commentators have argued forcefully that non-shareholder interests are not
properly within the purview of corporate law and should be addressed elsewhere.121 These
positions raise questions about the extent to which state and shareholder efforts that are
concerned with such interests should be understood to address internal corporate affairs.
These questions will not be confined to the legitimacy of SB 826. Other states may
follow California’s example and adopt board diversity requirements.122 A bill mandating both
gender and racial diversity on corporate boards is currently under consideration by the Illinois
legislature.123 A similar bill is already making its way through the New Jersey legislature.124
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Community leaders in Michigan are debating whether Michigan should follow suit.125
Moreover, SB 826 may reflect a state trend not merely to regulate board diversity but to extend
state corporate law to address a broader range of ESG issues. State legislators are unlikely to
limit such laws to businesses incorporated in the state.
Finally, the extent to which social welfare issues constitute part of a corporation’s
internal affairs has implications for the scope of private ordering that can be effected through
firm-specific charter and bylaw provisions. According to a recent Delaware decision, legitimacy
of such provisions depends in part on the scope of the internal affairs doctrine. In Salzberg, VC
Laster invalidated a forum selection bylaw on the grounds that, because it addressed the
litigation of securities fraud claims brought pursuant to §11 of the Securities Act of 1933, it was
beyond the legal bounds of a corporations’ bylaw authority under the Delaware statute.126 The
court reasoned that a corporation’s bylaws can only address internal corporate affairs. We note
that some shareholders have sought to use the shareholder proposal rule to address social welfare
issues, and the extent to which such efforts are legitimate depends in part on the scope of the
internal affairs doctrine. 127
Simply put, SB 826 provides reason to reconsider the scope of the internal affairs
doctrine. To the extent that SB 826 reflects an extension of corporate law to address a broader
range of interests and a more expansive conception of corporate purpose, the traditional
justifications for deference to the law of the state of incorporation are less compelling and the
forum state’s interests are more acute.
Similarly, regulatory competition is less desirable with respect to issues for which the
capital markets are poorly positioned to discipline firm choices. SB 826 can be understood as a
response to this problem. If the reasons for increased board diversity are both non-economic and
non-firm-specific, the capital markets are unlikely to encourage firms to increase board diversity
through private ordering. Stock prices will reward corporations for increased board diversity (or
punish corporations for the lack thereof) if and only if board diversity is tied to shareholder
value. Indeed, a recent empirical study of SB 826 finds that affected firms suffered a negative
price effect upon the legislation’s adoption, suggesting that market participants did not view the
statute (or similar non-economic legislation) as likely to improve the economic performance of
those firms.128 More generally, capital market discipline might actually undermine the ability of
corporations to use private ordering to pursue non-economic objectives through increased board
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diversity because, to the extent that board diversity sacrifices shareholder value in favor of the
interests of other constituencies, the effect on stock price creates an incentive for shareholders to
respond through their voting power.129
Finally, SB 826 is distinctive both because it is the first effort by a US state to mandate
board diversity and because it represents an unprecedented effort by a state to extend its
corporate law rules to address matters of societal rather than purely economic concerns. As
such, it highlights the fact that, for the most part, differences in US corporate law among the
states are relatively small.130 Historically, even in circumstances in which a state has adopted an
innovative provision, a number of other states are likely to follow suit.131 As a consequence,
regulatory competition in the United States should be understood less in terms of issuer choice
than in terms of imposing pressure toward convergence.
4. Implications for EU Regulatory Competition
What does this analysis tell us about the potential for regulatory competition in Europe
after Centros? First, it suggests that even at the time of the Centros decision, its potential impact
in terms of enabling regulatory competition was likely overstated. US regulatory competition is
premised on the norm of shareholder primacy, and European corporate law does not have the
same focus. “[M]ost European countries have corporate laws that expressly state that the
corporation's managers have a duty to consider all the stakeholders of the corporation, not just
stockholders, when managing the enterprise.132 European officers and directors must manage
their corporations in the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders and society as a whole.133
Similarly, considerations of sustainability and ESG are an accepted component of EU corporate
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responsibility,134 while in the US, the impact that such considerations should have upon
corporate operations remains hotly debated.135
Because of this difference in focus, the extent to which the internal affairs doctrine, at
least as understood in US terms, would require EU states to defer to the law of a corporation’s
state of incorporation remains unclear. Many components of EU company law focus on
protecting stakeholder interests or societal values. These provisions blur the line between
internal and external affairs and, under our theory of the internal affairs doctrine, offer a less
compelling case for deference to the law of the state of incorporation.
An example is the German codetermination requirement. Germany requires corporations
above a minimum size to provide employee representation on the corporation’s board of
directors, with the level of such representation depending upon the number of corporate
employees.136 For the corporations with at least 2000 employees, parity between worker and
shareholder representatives is required. In addition, codetermination mandates a minimum size
for the supervisory board, again depending on company size.137 Although, as with other
governance measures, it is difficult to analyze the relationship between codetermination and firm
value empirically, commentators have raised questions about impact of worker representation on
decision-making efficiency.138 In addition, studies suggest that the large board sizes, such as
those required under codetermination, are associated with lower firm value.139 Accordingly,
German codetermination, like SB 826, seems to be less about shareholder or economic value
than about protecting worker and societal interests.140 Indeed, the argument was made in the
Erzberger case that “the arrangement and conduct of German Supervisory Board elections reflect
legitimate economic and social policy choices, which are a matter for the Member States.”141
SB 826 also raises the issue of whether regulations concerned with the protection of
stakeholder or shareholder interests can be better justified than economic regulation in terms of
the home state’s interests. Under the Restatement of Conflicts or common law interest analysis,
a court’s choice of law may properly reflect the public policies of the local jurisdiction, and a
state is entitled to apply local law when it has a sufficient interest in doing so. To the extent that
134
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EU company law is focused on protecting a broader range of interests than those of shareholders,
a state may justifiably claim an interest in applying local law that protects those interests.
In considering this point, it is worth noting that the European Corporation or Societas
Europaea (SE) offers corporations a mechanism for obtaining increased flexibility and
mobility.142 Available since the early 2000s, the SE enables corporations that operate in more
than one European state to obtain partial relief from the differences in local law. For German
corporations, the SE allows a corporation to “freeze” both the size of its board and its level of
employee representation even if it subsequently grows to the point that it would become subject
to higher thresholds and allows new companies to avoid the codetermination requirement
entirely.143 Eidenmueller et al. find strong evidence that corporations use the SE to avoid
mandatory codetermination rules.144 Although the fact that German firms have the option of
forming an SE may appear to limit the claim that Germany has a compelling public policy
interest in applying codetermination to local corporations, an alternative explanation is that,
Germany also has an interest in encouraging the growth of supranational corporations and
promoting European unity.
Despite these advances, the degree of corporate harmonization present in the US is less
likely in Europe, at least in the near term. European corporate law differs among the various
European countries to a much greater degree than US corporate law differs among the states.145
These differences have persisted despite many years of harmonization efforts.146 Indeed, the
ambitious European Model Company Act highlighted both the differences among jurisdictional
approaches and the strong local policy considerations behind those differences. 147 Even on
matters in which EU corporate law appears to have converged, differences in ownership patterns
and institutional structures lead to significant differences in function.148 Importantly, a
substantial component of the policy differences stem from strong nationalist identities and
ambivalence about political integration that do not have a clear analogue in the United States.149
As one commentator has observed, “cultural and political factors make corporate migrations
‘less frictionless’ in Europe than in the United States, and thus reduce the level of competition
and convergence in the field of European company law.”150
That these differences persist despite Centros reinforces the claim that, in Europe,
company law reaches more broadly than shareholder value and internal corporate affairs. The
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breadth of national interests continues to provide compelling motivation for member states to
resist uniformity. This fact is illustrated by the EU approach to company law, in which a variety
of Directives impose mandatory norms or minimum standards but in which individual member
state implementation allows preservation of substantial differences.151
Conclusion
Centros was viewed as a landmark decision. At least some commentators celebrated its
potential to provide US-style corporate regulatory competition to EU corporations via the
internal affairs doctrine. But this outcome has not come to fruition. Centros has served a
levelling function with respect to some aspects of corporate law, but it has not created a market
in corporate mobility, nor has it spurred wholesale change to corporate codes.
This is not surprising. In the United States, the internal affairs doctrine has had a greater
harmonizing effect because of the role of US-style notions of shareholder primacy in shaping the
internal affairs doctrine. As such, we argue that in the US, the internal affairs doctrine is really a
rule of internal ordering of shareholder economic relations. Whether we call them corporate law
or something else, laws like SB 826 that are primarily directed to social welfare fall outside the
scope of a corporation’s internal affairs. This theory is consistent with views of regulatory
competition and efficiency that allow parties to select into their optimal governance law.
The lack of significant harmonization in Europe is explained by the fact that significant
parts of European corporate law, like SB 826, are really about social rather than economic
ordering. As such, corporate law incorporates national and societal values that individual
corporations are unwilling to reject by incorporating elsewhere.152 German corporations, for
example, generally accept, rather than seeking to avoid, the representation of labor interests
reflected in codetermination. SB 826 thus highlights the limited scope and potential for
harmonization of corporate law in Europe. It also explains Centros’ limited effects and the effort
to curb those effects by shifting pieces of legislation to areas explicitly outside corporate law.
Ironically, the ultimate conclusion from this analytical journey is that -- with the adoption
of SB 826 and the realistic prospect that other states will follow California’s lead -- the US may
beheading more towards a European style of governance, than vice versa. SB 826 and its effects,
thus inform our view of Centros, but also point to a US future in which legislatures increasingly
impose social-type legislation on US companies regardless of their state of incorporation as the
US moves away from its historical emphasis on shareholder primacy.153 The extent to which
such legislation can be understood as outside traditional corporate law and therefore beyond the
limits of the internal affairs doctrine will pose a challenge for US regulatory competition.
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